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Persistence and Change in Coordinated Market Economies – 
The Case of Venture Capital for Biotechnology in Switzerland 
 
Abstract: The institutional configuration of Switzerland resembles the ideal type of coordinated 
market economies (CMEs) which are said to be highly supportive for incremental innovations but 
not for radical innovations like biotechnology. Therefore, the emergence and success of Swiss 
biotechnology comes as a surprise. Against this background, our paper deals with the biotechnol-
ogy sector in Switzerland. Special attention will be drawn on venture capital. It can be shown that 
Switzerland has formed a specific variant of venture capital which nicely has adapted to its institu-
tional context. The case thus indicates that technological innovations have the effect that some 
elements of LMEs can be incorporated into CMEs. However, this occurs incrementally and in ac-
cordance with the overall institutional configuration.  
 
 
Introduction 
In the last decades, researchers have found evidence for profound and robust differences 
of national economies (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Whitley, 1999). On that basis a distinction 
between two modes of capitalism has been established: Liberal market economies (LMEs) 
and coordinated market economies (CMEs) (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Albeit this distinc-
tion is an ideal typical one and ideal types do not have an immediate expression in empiri-
cal reality, the United States are considered to be a prototypical example for the former 
and Germany for the latter. However, other nations have been characterized as hybrids 
mixing characteristic elements of both types (e.g. Campbell and Pedersen, 2007; Jackson 
and Deeg, 2006; more critically Arts and Gelissen, 2002). Other national economies have 
been described as objects of change, e.g. the UK and their strengthening of LME-
characteristics or Sweden and their weakening of CME-characteristics (Freeman et al., 
1997; Rhodes, 2000). Currently, there is a huge debate on how such changes can be ex-
plained theoretically and what mechanisms can be identified (Thelen, 2003; Campbell, 
2004, 2007; Hasse and Leiulfsrud, 2002.)  
 
It has been argued that the two types of capitalism differ profoundly with respect to their 
innovativeness and prevailing innovation strategies (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). 
LMEs are considered to be appropriate for radical innovations which can be defined with 
respect to new production processes and to new products. Radical innovations are often 
based on the utilization of new research fronts. Typically, new actors enter the stage and 
new markets emerge. CMEs, by contrast, seem to be more appropriate for incremental 
innovations. Typically, incremental innovations are pushed forward by established actors 
who seek to improve their position in pre-existing markets.  
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As we will outline in the first section, the institutional configuration of Switzerland re-
sembles the ideal type of CMEs. CMEs are said to be highly supportive for incremental 
innovations. Biotechnology, by contrast, is one of the most significant fields for radical 
innovations. Radical innovations “entail substantial shifts in product lines, the develop-
ment of entirely new goods, or major changes to the production process.” (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001, p. 38). As sectors which strongly rely on radical innovations, like biotech-
nology, find more supportive conditions in LMEs whose institutional setup is believed to 
result in competitive advantages for radical innovations, Swiss biotechnology comes as a 
surprise which deserves a closer look.  
Our paper thus deals with the emergence and the development of the biotechnology sector 
in Switzerland which can be observed since the mid nineties. Special attention will be 
drawn to venture capital because the provision with sufficient capital is considered to be a 
pre-condition for the economic utilization of radical new knowledge. Such venture capital 
is seen as a necessary condition of biotechnology but it normally is to be found in LMEs.  
 
The indication of the matter of fact that in Switzerland a market for venture capital for 
biotechnology has emerged is twofold: Firstly, it may be argued that characteristic fea-
tures of LMEs can – more or less easily - be integrated into CMEs. If so, the concept of 
institutional configurations should not be overstressed. Instead, researchers should be 
more aware about the possibility of a loose coupling of institutional elements, because, in 
practice, institutional features can be combined in unique ways and with respect to func-
tional requirements, normative expectations, and/or strategies of powerful actors. It should 
be noted, however, that this indication would weaken the entire idea of institutional con-
figurations which lies at the heart of the discussion on varieties of capitalism. The second 
indication is related to issues of change – either of Switzerland as the empirical case at 
issue or, more generalized, of CMEs which generally may have adapted to new challenges 
by incorporating elements of LMEs. This second indication is currently heavily debated 
within the varieties of capitalism-discourse (Schmidt 2000; for a discussion of institutional 
change in Germany see also Lane 2003; Höpner, 2003; Vitols, 2005). 
The case study of venture capital for biotechnology in Switzerland can be both related to 
the question of loosening the strength of the concept or to the issue of addressing institu-
tional change and hybridisation. Our empirical focus is on how elements of LMEs which 
are related to radical innovation can be integrated in a CME context – i.e. we address is-
sues of adaptation and change. For this purpose it is crucial to describe the emergence of 
venture capital for biotechnology-start ups in Switzerland historically and with respect to 
analytical dimensions. In so doing, we aim at discussing the potential of coordinated mar-
ket economies to be successfully involved in technological sectors which are based on 
radical innovations.  
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In the first section we begin with analysing the institutional framework of Switzerland and 
characterize it as a CME. This characterization is based on the dimension “financing”, 
“coordination mode” and “knowledge base”. Then, we describe types of innovation in 
biotechnology and its spread in Switzerland. The second section deals with the finance 
market for biotechnology. In order to discuss to what extent this finance market is liberal 
or coordinated, we will utilize the same analytical dimensions as before (“knowledge 
base”, “coordination mode”, “financial strategies”). Empirically, this part is based on our 
own investigation of biotechnology startups in Switzerland.1  
 
1. Institutional frameworks and biotechnology  
 
1.1 Institutional frameworks 
According to the Varieties of Capitalism framework, two basic types of capitalisms can be 
distinguished: liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies 
(CMEs) (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Whereas companies in LMEs rely more on market 
mechanisms to coordinate their endeavours, companies in CMEs obtain higher levels of 
non-market coordination. Analytically, types of capitalism have been differentiated with 
respect to five institutional domains: (1) industrial relations, (2) vocational training and 
education, (3) corporate governance, (4) inter-firm relations and (5) coordination of own 
employees (Hall and Soskice 2001: 7). For our purpose of utilising this approach for un-
derstanding innovation patterns, we can regroup these domains to three dimensions: (1) 
finance, (2) coordination and (3) knowledge base. Subsequently, we will firstly describe 
the respective characteristics of the two capitalisms before secondly discussing the par-
ticular characteristics of Switzerland. 
 
Finance 
Ideal typically LMEs have market-based financial systems whereas CMEs obtain bank-
based financial systems (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Jackson and Deeg, 2006, p. 13). Compa-
nies in LMEs are strongly dependent on their valuation on equity markets to secure fi-
nance and therefore have to focus on current profitability. Corporate control is exercised 
externally by the market of corporate control, which is also favoured by the regulatory 
regime. As capital markets require sufficient capital, it has also been argued that strong 
capital markets depend on the degree of income (in)equality and on the method of pension 
saving (Vitols, 2001a). In CMEs, companies have to a larger degree access to so called 
“patient capital” which enables companies to pursue more long-term oriented strategies. 
                                                     
1
 The project investigates in case studies of biotechnology start-ups and their institutional context. It is based 
on case studies and expert interviews with significant collaborators. Financial support has been provided by 
the Swiss National Fonds (SNF).  
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This also allows companies to more easily retain their workforce in times of economic 
downturn. Corporate control is exercised internally by dense networks between compa-
nies. 
 
Switzerland is well known for its bank-based system which is strongly supported by the 
important role of banks in corporate finance and the “pay as you go” financed pension 
scheme. Similar to Germany, the role of the big banks is supported by their dense person-
nel and financial networks to the big listed Swiss companies. Property structures of Swiss 
listed companies are also highly concentrated. According to Nollert (Nollert, 2005, p. 
406), 31,3% of the big Swiss companies is held by individuals or families, 30,3% by non 
financial companies and 25,3% by financial companies. In the last few years the role of 
the big Swiss private banks has changed to globally oriented financial service companies 
with a stronger focus on capital markets which has led to a reduction of allocated credits 
by them (Pedergnana, 2006). However, two-thirds of Swiss companies still have majority-
held property structures (Beiner, 2005, p. 29). 
 
Surprisingly for a bank-based system, the total market capitalisation (measured as a per-
centage of GDP) is very high in Switzerland and even outnumbers Anglo-Saxon countries 
(SFCW, 2007, p. 111), which indicates that market-based finance also plays an important 
role in the economy. The high market capitalisation can partly be explained by the high 
degree of income inequality (on a high level) with a relatively large number of high-
income households in Switzerland. These groups are said to be highly supportive for mar-
ket-based systems due to their greater capacity to invest and absorb short-term risks (Vi-
tols, 2001a). 
 
Coordination 
The term coordination refers to the degree of regulating labour markets as well as to rela-
tions between companies. LMEs are known for their deregulated labour markets which 
facilitate hire and fire practices. This characteristic enables companies to adapt their 
strategies flexibly to changing market conditions. Relations between companies are usu-
ally based on standard market relationships and formal contracts which is also supported 
by a rather strict antitrust regulation.  
 
In contrast to LMEs, CMEs have formally regulated labour markets that include generally 
higher levels of employment protection, higher wage replacement rates for unemploy-
ment, and institutions for labour participation in management and collective bargaining 
institutions such as work councils. These elements render labour markets of CMEs less 
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flexible. Inter-company relations in CME are more cooperative and several institutions 
support relational contracting among companies. 
 
Switzerland appears to present a case which falls in the middle. Labour markets clearly 
are less regulated than in Germany though there are still moderate levels of employment 
protection and wage replacement rates. Relations between companies, however, are more 
in line with the CME-mode. They have similar origins than in Germany, namely the for-
mation of cartels by the big private banks at the end of the 19th century. This structural 
element has persisted after the Second World War and it has been restricted only very 
hesitantly (Nollert, 2005, p. 167). Swiss corporate law also has several laws and proce-
dures to support the strong personnel and capital links between companies that also en-
force non market-based coordination between companies (David et al., 2004). 
 
Knowledge base 
Education and skill creation are regarded as essential determinants of the overall system 
that also influences other institutional determinants (Jackson and Deeg, 2006, p. 17; 
Thelen, 2004). LMEs usually rely on organization-based qualification systems (Müller 
and Shavit, 1998), which strongly rely on skill development. Skill development is centred 
on generic and publicly visible skills, easily sold on highly fluid labour markets. LMEs, 
however, have higher amounts of university education, and the economic utilization of 
research can be realised more easily. Basic research, here, is less detached from the poten-
tial for application. 
 
CMEs, by contrast, have high levels of vocational training, which creates highly industry-
specific skills. As companies invest in these training systems, employee-employer rela-
tionships have a relative long-term horizon and promote competence-enhancing human 
resource development (Casper and Whitley, 2004, p. 95). Obviously, the production struc-
ture of CMEs relies on a highly skilled labour force. Higher education, by contrast, is less 
widespread. Scientific research, correspondingly, is either tightly integrated into industries 
with close bonds to big corporate actors or it is rather decoupled from any economic utili-
sation.  
 
Switzerland’s training system is based on high levels of vocational training (Hotz-Hart, 
2003, p. 48). This can be partly explained by the fairly low return on higher education in 
Switzerland in terms of income. As a result, the percentage of Swiss graduates averages 
13 % which lies far below the OECD average of 25,9% (Dümmler, 2004, p. 5). This lack 
of degrees in higher education corresponds with a high degree of internationalization of 
PhD students, researchers and professors at Swiss universities. Thus, one may argue that 
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in higher education and in basic research, Switzerland imports its workforce to a substan-
tial extent. Public spending of R&D is far below OECD average. It is predominantly in-
vested in public research institutions which, in the case of Switzerland and due to a lack of 
other public research institutions, can almost be equated with universities. Though public 
spending is low, Switzerland ranks quite high in total spending in R&D. This indicates 
that the contribution of the industry sector is fairly high.   
 
1.2 Biotechnology 
It has been argued that institutional arrangements have profound impacts on innovation 
and help to explain different innovation strategies and structures (Hollingsworth and 
Boyer, 1997; Casper and Whitley, 2004, p. 90). Accordingly, the highly flexible deregu-
lated labour markets, the focus on generic skills and the supply of market-based finance in 
LMEs encourage companies to innovate in rapidly moving technology sectors which 
strongly rely on radical innovations. The term radical innovation hereby refers to substan-
tial shifts in product lines, the development of entirely new goods or major changes in the 
production process. This type of innovation is said to be important in fast-moving tech-
nology sectors like biotechnology, which also strongly rely on research.  
 
CMEs are said to have comparative institutional advantages in sectors that are character-
ized by incremental innovations, i.e. continuous but small scale improvements in existing 
product lines and production processes. This type of innovation is supported by industry-
specific skills of the workforce, stable, long-term employee relationships and patient, 
long-term oriented capital. It is also based on dense relations between specialised research 
institutions and big companies. Note that these relations can be expected to match with the 
overall mode of coordination. It thus may be concluded that Switzerland has comparative 
institutional advantages in technology sectors which predominantly rely on incremental 
innovations. 
 
Varieties of biotechnology  
Biotechnology is often seen as one of the most promising technologies of the future. Ac-
cording to the definition of the OECD (OECD, 2006, p. 5) biotechnology implies the “ap-
plication of science and technology to living organisms, as well as parts, products and 
models, thereof, to alter living organisms, as well as parts, products and models thereof, to 
alter living or nonliving materials for the production of knowledge, goods and services. 
Particularly important in this definition is the use of living organisms and their alteration 
(see also Fuhrer, 2005, p. 9). According to the definition of the Cambridge Health Insti-
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tute2 one can differentiate between three biotech sub-sectors: Biotechnology Therapeutics3 
(www.swisslifesciences.com), Biotechnology R&D Services4 
(www.swisslifesciences.com) and Biotechnology Others5 (www.swisslifesciences.com). 
 
When classifying the three sub-sectors in terms of radical vs. incremental innovations, it is 
obvious that only the first definition suits the characteristics of a radical innovation. The 
development of new therapeutics involves intensive research combined with a high failure 
risk and a considerable amount of capital required. In contrast to the first sub-sector, the 
other two sub-sectors are more in accordance with the characteristics of incremental inno-
vations. They involve less risk and their business models are similar to companies in e.g. 
engineering or manufacturing which also profit from industry or firm-specific skills of the 
workforce and credit-based finance.  
 
Firms can specialize on either innovation type of biotechnology, but they can also aim at a 
combination. Some firms, e.g., concentrate on both new drug development and developing 
platform technologies with the latter being offered to other research institutions. Though 
such non-specialization limits both the potential for specialization and the utilization of 
economies of scale, it is more widespread than expected. Some startups, e.g. start with 
developing platform technologies, set up business relations on that basis, and gain status 
and reputation as competent and reliable business partner. Against this background they 
plan to develop new drugs at a later stage of their life cycle (Duschek, 2008). 
 
The emergence of biotechnology in Switzerland  
The emergence of the Swiss Biotech sector can be dated back to the mid-nineties, which 
in comparison to the USA, is quite late. The development was fostered by the merger of 
the two big Swiss pharmaceutical companies Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy at the beginning of 
1996, which is today known as Novartis. At the same time Biotechnology became more 
and more important for the pharmaceutical sector. Therefore, companies like Roche and 
Novartis have not only hived off their own companies in the following years but they have 
also established cooperations with biotech companies.  
                                                     
2
  The CHI obtains a recognized glossary for biotechnology which is also used by the Swiss life sciences data 
base. 
3
 „Biotechnology is, broadly speaking, the applied use of living organisms or their components to make or 
modify products, to improve plants or animals and to develop microorganisms for specific uses. A narrower 
definition, (often called “new” or second-generation biotechnology), restricts the term to the use of recombi-
nant DNA, monoclonal antibody and other modern techniques arising from applications of molecular biol-
ogy.” 
4
 „Biotechnology/ R&D Services are the tool companies providing the picks and shovels of the biotechnology 
industry.“ 
5
 Companies of this category do not conform with the narrower definition of Biotechnology but their products 
and services are very close to this industry or strongly related to this area, respectively. 
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Swiss universities have also become more active during the nineties in supporting univer-
sity spin-offs by founding technology transfer offices and providing courses on company 
foundation and entrepreneurship. The importance of universities for biotechnology is also 
observable by the clustering of biotech companies around the universities of Zurich, Basel 
and Geneva/ Lausanne (Zeller, 2005; compare also Niosi and Banik, 2005 for similar re-
sults). These areas have also established several technoparks for their spin offs.  
 
Swiss biotechnology companies also can be characterized with respect to sub-sectors. The 
results of such a breakdown are in line of what can be expected in CMEs. More than 50% 
of the companies belong to R&D service companies. The third category “Biotechnology 
Others” comprehends 21%. Thus, the majority of Swiss biotech companies are active in 
sub-sectors where incremental innovations prevail, which is perfectly in accordance with 
the institutional characteristics of Switzerland’s CME.6  
LMEs, by contrast, have a share of +/- 50 % in Biotech Therapeutics. However, at least 
26% of Switzerland´s Biotech companies are active in the therapeutic sector, although the 
institutional framework is said to disadvantage this type of innovation. Therefore the ques-
tion arises, to what extent does this sub-sector fit into the institutional arrangement of 
Switzerland`s CME?  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6
 It should be noted that this breakdown is even more pronounced for Germany as a more pure case of coordi-
nated economies (Figure 1). 
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2. Characteristic features of therapeutic biotech finance 
As finance plays a decisive role for therapeutic biotech companies, we will subsequently 
discuss characteristics of therapeutic biotech finance in Switzerland. Investments in highly 
uncertain technologies like biotechnology are a very risky business and often fail, but at 
the same time expected returns can be very high (Thalmann, 2004; Taga and Forstner, 
2002, p. 117). According to the model, equity capital predominantly is to be found in 
LMEs where it supports research and development on radical innovations. Within equity 
capital a formal and an informal market can be distinguished (Haemmig, 2003; Riffel-
macher, 2006).  
 
The formal market is composed of venture capital and corporate venture capital. Its char-
acteristic elements can be described as follows: The provision of research intensive com-
panies with capital (and with corresponding services) requires a highly sophisticated 
workforce. Most often venture capitalists hold a higher degree in finance or economics, 
but to some extent they also must solve the problem of evaluating the projects of their 
clients from a technical point of view. Thus, specialized experts from science or engineer-
ing tend to be incorporated into venture capital teams. Often, they hold a PhD and have 
been actively involved in research before. Another characteristic feature of a former ven-
ture capital market is a sufficient number of actors on the supply side and on the demand 
side. This feature can be seen as a functional requirement for triggering market mecha-
nisms. If there are not sufficient actors on one of the two sides, by contrast, prices can be 
determined by other mechanisms. As a consequence of a large number of venture capital-
ists, specialization with respect to regions and technology fields are to be found. Addition-
ally, finance actors tend to concentrate on venture capital instead of getting involved in 
other finance activities. 
In the informal venture market, by contrast, capital is provided by business angels. Busi-
ness angels are wealthy individuals with an entrepreneurial and/or managerial back-
ground. They do not only invest their own capital but often also support startups with their 
business experience and with their well established networks. Most often, business angels 
invest in sectors or technologies they are familiar with. Additionally, business angels tend 
to prefer investments close to their residence in order to keep in touch with the day to day-
practices of the companies they support. However, business angels do not need to be a-
ligned with the respective company. Neither do they get involved as co-founders, nor are 
personal relations of friendship or kinship a characteristic feature (Riffelmacher, 2006, p. 
6; Fueglistaller et al., 2004, p. 265). 
 
In Switzerland, we can identify four different types of players who are active in the risk 
capital market for biotechnology: (1) venture funds which, in theory, are characteristic for 
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LMEs, (2) the corporate venture fund of Novartis, the pharmaceutical giant which is heav-
ily interested in the utilization and marketing of new drugs, (3) business angels who either 
provide just money or also play an active role within the company, and (4) the cantonal 
banks. The big private banks (Credit Suissse and UBS), by contrast, do not invest in the 
biotech sector. In what follows we will discus the venture capital market in Switzerland. 
In order to do that analytically, we will refer to those three dimensions which can be util-
ized in order characterize contemporary market economies. We begin by discussing the 
knowledge base venture capital providers, then draw our attention on prevailing modes of 
coordination, and finally discuss financial strategies. In so doing, we can tackle the issue 
of institutional variation and change of Switzerland as given institutional context.  
 
2.1 Knowledge base 
Venture capital firms provide their clients with capital, and typically they also offer finan-
cial services and access to networks (for the different functions of venture capital firms 
see also Castilla et al., 2000, Cohen and Fields, 2000, Kenney and Florida, 2000; Such-
man et al., 2001; Saxenian, 1994). These services – as well as the selection of clients – 
require knowledge from financial experts. An academic background in finance or econom-
ics thus seems to be the most appropriate qualification for venture capitalists. However, 
venture capitalists must also evaluate the research & development of their potential cli-
ents. Firms may collaborate with specialized scientific experts in order to evaluate issues 
of research & development of their potential clients. They can also incorporate scientists 
in their teams. In practice, the technological knowledge of venture capitalists is often lim-
ited, but they can cope with this deficit by specializing in certain technological fields, in 
which they can develop and improve their competences.  
 
Against this background one may be taken by surprise that in Swiss venture capital teams 
technological and scientific knowledge is widespread. A scientific background in pharma-
ceutical sciences, often with a specialisation in genomics, virology or genetics, seems to 
be the rule and not the exception. Some members of venture capital firms also hold a PhD 
in microbiology. As a rule, career paths do not start within a venture capital company but 
with research and then managerial experience in the pharmaceutical industry. To be pre-
cise, venture capitalists often have worked before at one of the two big pharmaceutical 
companies Roche or Novartis (formerly Sandoz and Ciba-Geigy). Some venture capital-
ists have also completed an executive training program (e.g. at Harvard Business School). 
In particular, CEOs have acquired such further training. Furthermore, there is frequently 
one or at maximum two persons who hold a business degree. These economic and finance 
experts gained business experience not in the financial sector but in consulting companies 
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like Ernst & Young and PWC. It also should be noted that this is not the CEO who tradi-
tionally has a technological (science) background. 
 
Venture capital firms are not the only institutions which provide Swiss start-ups with capi-
tal. However, the qualification structure within the industry venture fond is quite similar, 
which is more plausible as former careers within the two big pharmaceutical companies 
were generally not focused on business but rather on technology. It thus may be argued 
that, in comparison to what has been said about venture capitalists in more liberal market 
economies such as the US, technical competencies are more sophisticated and widespread 
while financial and business competences are less pronounced.  
 
The academic background of business angels cannot be generalized: Some have a scien-
tific background but business degrees can also be found. There seems to be a tendency 
that business angels from the Basel region, where the chemical industry is concentrated, 
have more often pharmaceutical experience due to their former employment by Roche or 
Novartis whereas their colleagues from Zurich, which is the finance-center of Switzerland, 
have generally not worked within this area. This also confirms the fact that business an-
gels prefer local investment, and it indicates that business angels reflect the knowledge of 
their region. Regardless to such different specializations, business angels have a long time 
working experience within one or several companies. 
 
The qualification structure within the cantonal banks is in sharp contrast to the research-
based workforce in venture capital teams. Cantonal banks are public institutions which are 
deeply embedded in the local economy. I some cases, they provide start-ups with capital, 
either to gain profit in the distant future, or to gain legitimacy due to the high status of 
technology start-ups. In cantonal banks employees most often hold a business degree from 
university or polytechnics, but generally not a PhD. Accordingly, cantonal banks do not 
specialize in particular sub-sectors or sub-fields of biotechnology. Therefore, they consult 
external advisors to evaluate projects and select promising candidates.  
 
As the case of the cantonal banks is exceptional, the qualification structure of the work-
force which provides start-ups with venture capital is not primarily based on an academic 
background in finance or economics. Such emphasis on technological competences is 
rather typical for CMEs. It resembles Germany`s qualification structure at times of the 
Deutschland AG which, among other things has been characterized by CEOs holding an 
engineering background instead of formal qualifications in business and finance. It thus 
may be concluded that venture capital in the institutional context of CMEs is primarily 
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based on technological competences, which facilitates cooperation between venture capi-
talists and their clients.  
 
2.2 Coordination 
Seen from an abstract point of view, risk capital is in need for a large number of potential 
clients. First, it is important to select the most promising start-ups from those which focus 
upon less promising projects. Second, the risk of investments in start-ups with high profit 
chances only can be reduced to a feasible extent if a large number of candidates compen-
sate the low success probability of a single project. Start-ups, by contrast, can benefit from 
low degrees of concentration of venture capital as negotiations between demand side and 
suppliers are more power balanced. Additionally, dense competition triggers specializa-
tion and makes it more likely to find an appropriately specialized venture capitalist.  
 
Switzerland, by contrast, is to be characterised as a small number-market. Actors know 
each other personally, and offer and demand are rather limited in comparison to US tech-
nology clusters. Accordingly one interview partner has explained that “if one is part of the 
real risk capital scene, he or she gets to know every dossier which will pass”. Probably as 
a result of size, the allocation of risk capital in therapeutic research displays high levels of 
non market coordination. Terms and conditions are not subject to free negotiations be-
tween start-ups and venture capitalists. Instead, they result from collective cooperation 
through arrangements between the different venture capitalists. As similar effects are also 
reported for locally situated venture capitalists in the Bay Area, this may partly be ex-
plained by the small number of venture capitalists in Switzerland. While in California non 
local venture capitalists enter the stage as soon as a considerable excess demand for ven-
ture capital emerges, Swiss biotechnology remains largely a domain for Swiss venture 
capital. 
 
The coordination between venture capital companies is also supported by the fact that 
their CEOs often are members of several supervisory boards of biotech companies. This 
linkage between finance and production clearly resembles personal and financial linkages 
of banks and industry which are a characteristic element of CMEs. As a result for biotech 
companies, risk capital is available in Switzerland but it is reported to be more expensive 
than in LMEs with a higher amount of competition among venture capitalists.  
 
Coordination modes of business angels resemble the one of corporate venture funds. Bu-
siness angels are generally organized in local clubs. Business plans are either selected 
after a presentation in one of the clubs or through recommendation of another business 
angel. Typically (and similar to venture capitalists), there are three or four business angels 
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who decide to invest and they select one of the business angels who take an active role in 
the company. This involvement then ranges from being chief executive to providing a 
company with access to networks. Business angels may also deal with marketing issues or 
with the acquisition of new investors. 
 
The allocation of risk capital by cantonal banks differs due to the very specific features of 
cantonal banks. Cantonal banks are restricted to the respective canton – a politically de-
fined local territory. As a consequence, there is no competition, cooperation or specializa-
tion between the different cantonal banks as, e.g., the cantonal bank of Zurich is not des-
ignated to invest in Start-Ups in Basel or Geneva. It also should be noted that cantonal 
banks are not represented in the supervisory boards of biotech companies. This difference 
helps the banks to avoid potential conflicts of interest. It also reduces responsibilities 
which in the case of cantonal banks as public institutions may be more pronounced. 
Again, however, cantonal banks are exceptional and only rarely made use of. The struc-
ture resembles the way thrifts and cooperative banking associations in coordinated market 
economies are committed to small and medium enterprises in their regional context. 
 
As the market is small, players also participate in the same networks. Actually, investment 
decisions often are made on the basis of recommendations of competitors. Accordingly, 
one interview partner of a cantonal bank has explained that they often co-invest with ven-
ture funds and business angels where positive experiences have been made with and whe-
re a similar understanding of business ethics and culture can be found. Furthermore, the 
different players are rather complementary to each other in terms of investment and (in 
most of the cases) do not compete with each other. As a consequence, reputation is a cru-
cial resource for start-ups to successfully acquire capital.  
 
Though cantonal banks are exceptional capital providers, it can be argued that modes of 
coordination are applied which are characteristic for the institutional context of CMEs. 
This holds also true for private venture capitalists whose sheer existence often is assumed 
to be a characteristic feature of LMEs. In Switzerland, private venture capitalists have not 
contributed to an erosion of generally close linkages between finance and production. 
Instead, they have adapted to – and strengthened – this characteristic feature of CMEs. 
Thus, one may not be taken by surprise that venture capital in Switzerland has developed a 
degree of coordination which in LMEs would be rather unusual.     
 
2.3 Financial actors’ strategies 
The characteristic feature of venture capital is to invest in early stages of a product devel-
opment. These investments are extremely risky, because return on investment is in the 
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distant future. Additionally, it is rather uncertain whether any return can be expected, be-
cause of a low success probability. Compared with this characteristic, investment strate-
gies of venture funds appear to be rather risk averse in Swiss biotechnology. Venture capi-
talists clearly prefer to invest in later stages. They do not, for example, give money to 
projects which have not passed the clinical test stage (phase 2a)7. Lack of dense competi-
tion among providers with venture capitalist and the high degree of coordination between 
them result in the reproduction of this practical rule.  
 
Although it is also reported that venture capitalists elsewhere tend to avoid early stage 
financing (Taga and Forstner, 2002, p. 23), their entrance is much earlier than those of 
their Swiss counterparts (phase 1 and before). In this respect it may be concluded that such 
a more pronounced risk aversion is a typical characteristic of CMEs. The restriction to 
financing only later stages of drug development was only weakened during the investment 
boom at the turn of the century. Thereafter, investors regretfully returned to more risk-
averse strategies as in Germany after the investment crash in stock equity (Vitols, 2001b).  
 
Not financing early stage-research indicates that there is a sufficient number of potential 
clients which could be provided with venture capital in order to continue with research 
and development. Early stage-provision with capital seems to be sufficient as there are no 
indicators for a shortcoming of clients which have survived these early stages. Sufficiency 
of clients, of course, is to be seen as a function of the number and density of competing 
venture capitalists. As competition is weak, no early stage financing is to be expected.  
 
In sharp contrast to venture funds, the industrial venture fund and the cantonal banks in-
vest early stage. It should be noted, however, that in both cases there are other rationalities 
involved. The industrial fond has primary the strategic orientation of finding new deals for 
its parent company as Novartis cannot pursue all research by itself. Early stage financing 
predominantly is to be seen as an investment in research. It is an alternative to in-house 
research, and to a much lesser extent as a financial investment in the stricter sense. Addi-
tionally, in-licensing also presents a way to benefit from current research by minimizing 
the downside risk at the same time. It also presents a way to control the pharmaceutical 
sector and to keep a centre position within the innovation network. As the fund is financed 
                                                     
7
 Drug development proceeds through a long process (see also Hinze et al., 2001). At first, preclinical studies 
are conducted, involving in vitro and in vivo experiments. Afterwards, clinical trials are started which usually 
contain four phases. In phase 1 the drug is tested on a small (20-100) group of healthy volunteers. In phase 2 
the drug is tested on larger groups (100-500) of patients, suffering from the disease. Phase 2 is often divided 
into two sub phases: phase 2a and phase 2b. Phase 2a assesses dosing requirements, phase 2b studies the 
efficacy of the drug. In phase 3 the drug is tested on large patient groups (500-3000) over a longer period of 
time. Phase 3 is the most expensive phase. 
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by its parent company, it is obviously not so much dependant on financial performance 
than its venture counterparts.  
Business angels sometimes also invest early stage. Generally, they have already been suc-
cessful in the business world and they actively want to “help to get a start-up started from 
scratch.” In such cases they do not give money without their own participation, and moti-
vation cannot be reduced to strict financial investment as a means to make profit. 
 
For cantonal banks, finally, the financing of small and medium companies of the regional 
economy is an integral part of their activity. They can symbolically utilize such invest-
ments for signalling their responsibility for the socio-economic context. In order to under-
stand this strategy it is important to take the very specific character of cantonal banks into 
consideration. The most prominent is their protection by government liability which is 
comparable to German thrifts (Sparkassen). Furthermore, their aim (as codified in the 
statutes) is not to maximize profit but to support and contribute to the economic develop-
ment of the respective canton. Finally are cantonal banks a public institution which each 
canton has. To put it bluntly: cantonal banks are regionally powerful and important non 
profit-organizations. 
 
In the 1990s some cantonal banks of research intensive regions started a program to sup-
port high technology start ups in their respective canton. Risk capital is allocated either by 
convertible bonds or mezzanine money. The program supports a limited number of com-
panies (ca. 20 per year) according to an investment limit of 15 Mio CHF per year which is 
already written off in the balance sheet. It also follows from the organizational type of 
cantonal banks that they are not exclusively aiming at making profits. Firstly, providing 
start-ups with risk capital can also be used for achieving legitimacy. Supporting young 
innovative companies is highly appreciated by the public and by the media. It therefore is 
very supportive for their reputation and “self-marketing”. Accordingly, in an expert inter-
view which has been conducted in line with our research project, one interviewee em-
phatically claimed “that the primary aim is not to make money but to be part of a success 
story.” Secondly can cantonal banks set up relations, because they are at the centre of the 
regional economy of their canton. Providing start ups with capital sometimes also is seen 
as an investment in potential follow-up business. Such follow ups, then, corresponds more 
to the traditional business of banks and thrifts like financial security, loans, assurances, 
etc. 
 
To conclude, one can observe the emergence of a risk capital market in Switzerland which 
supports the development of therapeutic companies. As venture capital markets are a cha-
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racteristic element of LMEs and corresponding innovation paths, it comes as a surprise 
that we do find it in Switzerland which can be seen as a variant of CMEs. A closer look at 
this market and its actors, however, offers some explanation: Business relations do not 
function on market based coordination. Instead, there is a small number of suppliers who-
se institutionalized interests in making profit differ. Nevertheless there are close bonds 
between these suppliers. Suppliers of venture capital can easily observe each other and 
develop common standards and principles. They may even communicate the evaluation of 
potential clients which makes reputation a crucial parameter for start-ups. Summing up, it 
may be argued that in Switzerland a coordinated form of risk capital has developed. Its 
characteristic features nicely fit into the broader institutional arrangement of Switzerland 
as a coordinated market economy.  
 
Conclusion 
Based on case studies from Switzerland, this paper has dealt with biotechnological inno-
vations and their provision with venture capital. In the first part, we have described both 
the institutional framework of Switzerland and characteristics of the biotech sector. While 
Switzerland was characterized as a variant of coordinated market economies (CMEs), 
biotechnology was shown to be a technological field where both radical and incremental 
innovations are to be found. With respect to the latter, we found evidence that biotechnol-
ogy in Switzerland predominantly is emphasizing upon instrumentation and services. As 
instrumentation and services is a sub-sector of biotechnology that is characterized by in-
cremental innovations, such an emphasis corresponds with the institutional setup of Swit-
zerland as CME. However, there is also research on therapeutic development which aims 
at radical innovations. As radical innovations find more appropriate conditions in liberal 
economies this is a rather surprising phenomenon.  
 
Because one crucial requirement of radical innovations is provision with sufficient venture 
capital, the second part of the paper has dealt with the emergence and with characteristic 
features of the risk capital market in Switzerland. The provision with risk capital is said to 
be particularly important for the development of therapeutics but rather untypical for 
CMEs. In order to analyse the venture capital market, we have described it with respect to 
its knowledge base, its mode of coordination, and financial strategies. Because any of 
these dimension offer criteria for distinguishing between coordinated and liberal econo-
mies, we could show that a type of risk capital industry has emerged that nicely fits into 
the institutional context of coordinated economies. In this respect, the emergence of a risk 
capital market is not to be seen as a radical institutional change in Switzerland.  
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Two main conclusions can be drawn from our case study. Firstly, a closer look at the vari-
ety of innovation types of a certain technology allows us to explain that technologies may 
fit into a broad range of institutional configurations. Our differentiation by sub-sectors of 
biotechnology has shown that some of those are perfectly in accordance with the institu-
tional framework of CMEs. Basic technologies such as biotechnology are thus incorpo-
rated selectively and with respect to institutional characteristics of the national context. 
Secondly, the case sheds light on issues of stability and change of institutional configura-
tions. By taking a closer look at characteristics of the risk capital market in Switzerland, 
we have shown that new institutional elements can be incorporated which are rather un-
typical for CMEs. However, financial strategies, modes of coordination and knowledge 
bases of these risk capital markets are formed in accordance with characteristic features of 
CMEs.  
 
Summing up, one may argue that technological innovations (e.g. therapeutic development 
in biotechnology) have the effect that some elements of LMEs (such as risk capital) easily 
can be incorporated into CMEs. Institutional arrangements are thus more flexible than it is 
often assumed. They are responsive to changing conditions and aim at utilizing new tech-
nologies though innovations might require adaptations of the institutional set-up. How-
ever, it could be shown that they do so incrementally and in accordance with the overall 
institutional configuration.  
 
The extent at which, in the longer run, such changes trigger further adaptations and more 
profound forms of institutional change currently cannot be estimated. However, it might 
be speculated that new actors such as biotechnology start-ups and venture capital compa-
nies put pressure on the strategic orientation of established ones (e.g. Swiss banks), that 
new qualification profiles gain strength (e.g. academic education) and, correspondingly, 
that new forms of co-ordination (i.e. market mechanisms) get hold. If so, this would hint 
at more pronounced changes – and it would be important to know whether such long run-
incremental variations are the typical mode of social change in CMEs (whereas radical 
social change might prevail in LMEs).  
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